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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following 9/11 and as part of what was termed a “global war on 
terror,” the Bush Administration applied detention and interrogation 
operations across three jurisdictional locations—inside the United States, 
within war and occupation zones, and inside other foreign countries. This 
article considers interactions of applicable law across these three locales 
within the context of assertions of presidential power, the severity of 
human rights violations, and the alleged necessity based on pragmatic 
assessments of imminent threat, to interpret how these variables are 
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related to punishment and remedial relief. Despite calls from experts and 
human rights organizations for compensation and punishment,1 the 
settlement of $5.28 million that L-3 Services offered to 71 Iraqi detainee-
plaintiffs in January 2013 was the only glimmer of precedent for 
remedial relief, and even then the private military contractor emphasized 
to the federal court that “[n]o court in the United States has allowed 
aliens—detained on the battlefield or in the course of postwar 
occupations by the U.S. military—to seek damages for detention.”2 
  
 * M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), 
LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses 
for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and 
business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami. 
 1.  See, e.g., Demand Accountability for Torture and Abuse, AMNESTY 
INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/torture/accountability-for-torture 
(recommending that Obama investigate and hold responsible U.S. officials who 
“unlawfully detained, unlawfully rendered to torture, and those tortured and abused in 
U.S. custody”); Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment 
of Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (July 12, 2011),  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0711webwcover_1.pdf (supporting a 
criminal investigation of “the CIA secret detention program, and the rendition of 
detainees to torture.”); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2009) (noting the 2001 to 2009 sanctions to use secret detention, 
forced disappearances, and coercive interrogations involved “serial criminality,” war 
crimes, torture, and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment that “implicat[es] universal 
jurisdiction and a universal responsibility.”); Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A 
Citizen’s View of Criminal Prosecution in U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. 
Civilian Authority and Military Generals for Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. L. COMM. 503, 624-28, 641-43 (2008) (listing nearly fifty top 
officials at the White House, Pentagon, CIA, and Justice Department who abetted 
potential offenses, including Common Article 3 War Crimes; non-Common Article 3 war 
crimes; conspiracy or solicitation to commit crimes of violence; conspiracy to kill, 
kidnap, maim, or injure others in a foreign country; torture; conspiracy to torture, assault, 
and maim; deprivation of rights under color of law; conspiracy to deprive of rights; 
cover-up of crimes; and state law crimes); ‘Countdown with Keith Olberman’ for 
Thursday, April 10, MSNBC (Apr. 10, 2008),  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24068197/ns/msnbc_tv-
countdown_with_keith_olbermann (Professor Jonathan Turley remarked: ”It was a 
torture program . . . approved at the very highest level . . . And it goes right to the 
President’s desk. . . . It’s always been a war crimes tribunal ready to happen.”). 
 2. Pete Yost, Iraqis Held at Abu Ghraib, Other Sites Get $5M, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/feedarticle/10602673. 
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Perhaps even more unsettling is the retrospective lack of justification for 
interrogation on utilitarian grounds. In 2014, a CIA investigation 
acknowledged that the use of harsh interrogation methods, secret prisons, 
and extraordinary renditions to abusive foreign security services, “did not 
produce any significant counter-terrorism breakthrough in the years after 
the 2001 attacks and the CIA officials misstated or exaggerated the 
results to other agencies and to Congress.”3 
Part II provides an analytic framework and specifies the President’s 
assertion of authority within locales of interrogation and Part III 
particularizes the relative harm from the unilateralism. From this 
foundation, Part IV addresses the three high-profile general outcomes of 
detention—suspected terrorists were convicted of crimes; those carrying 
out detention and interrogation were convicted for exceeding laws of 
war, criminal law, and human rights rules; and whether victims of human 
rights abuse were granted remedies. 
II. A CONTINUUM OF POWER AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 
After 9/11, a primal risk-aversion infixed the assumption that 
detention and severe psychological interrogation methods were essential 
for ferreting out details of terror plots from an al-Qaeda network with 
thousands of members inside sixty countries.4 Four years after 9/11, 
70,000 detainees had been held for varying durations.5 Status of 
detainees in various locations determine applicable law and detainee 
rights, but the sweeping Commander in Chief authority commingled 
detainees who should have had distinct classifications and averted 
  




 4. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 5 (Sept. 2002) (“thousands of trained terrorists remained at large”); The Power 
of Nightmares, Part III: The Shadows in the Cave, BBC 2 TELEVISION (Nov. 4, 2002), 
 http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/video1040.htm (shortly after 9/11, 
Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained: “This is a network that has 
penetrated into some 60 countries . . .”). 
 5. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AMR 51/063/2005, 
GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND: THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF UNCHECKED EXECUTIVE 
POWER (2005). 
296 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.2 
applicable legal restrictions. The following analytic depicts the assertion 
of presidential power and the severity of human rights violations: 
 
Figure 1: Relative Executive Authority & Human Rights 
Violations 
 
In Locale 1, inside the U.S., assertions of Executive power are the 
most justifiable to the extent that actions are reasonable to thwart a 
potential peril because it is the President’s core, preclusive, and inherent 
constitutional obligation to protect Americans on U.S. sovereign 
territory.6 Congress also passed the Patriot Act,7 which the Executive 
  
 6. President Thomas Jefferson, who spoke from the context of negotiating and 
consummating the Louisiana Purchase without treaty approval procedures, stated that the 
“law of necessity, of self-preservation, . . . [requires] saving our country when in 
danger.” U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & U.S. SENATE 
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interpreted to extend authority to wiretap, detain suspects, and deport 
non-citizens8 pursuant to an expansive definition of “domestic terrorism” 
that included “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; [or] . . . appear to be 
intended . . . to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion.”9 
For the war and occupation zones of locale II, Congress activates and 
specifies the conditions for the Commander in Chief authority for all but 
those operations in imminent defense of the nation and possibly when 
there is minor military conflict or distant missile strikes.10 On September 
18, 2001, Congress adopted the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) and empowered the President to use force against individuals, 
groups, and states involved with the 9/11 attacks and to prevent abettors 
to the attacks from committing future acts of terrorism.11 Based on the 
AUMF, President Bush issued Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism on November 13, 
2001, which permitted the Secretary of Defense to detain any individual 
who the Administration believed was a member of al-Qaeda, engaged in 
  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN 
OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR WITH SUPPLEMENTARY, MINORITY, AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS 465, H. 
REPT. NO. 100-433, S. REPT. NO. 100-216 (1987); R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and 
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938) (citing Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster’s position in the Caroline case and expressing that “acts of self-defense must 
occur only during the last feasible window of opportunity in the face of an attack that is 
almost certainly going to occur”). 
 7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 8. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2013) (interpreting exceptions for extended detainment 
of foreigners inside the US as constitutional under the Patriot Act); JAMES CARROLL, 
CRUSADE: CHRONICLES OF AN UNJUST WAR 47 (2004).  
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2013).  
 10. Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asymmetric 
Information in the “Zone of Twilight”, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 28-36 (2012); Robert 
Bejesky, Precedent Supporting the Constitutionality of Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2012). 
 11. Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al Qaeda and Iraq, 56 
HOW. L.J. 1, 8-15 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, CFP]. 
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terrorism against the U.S., or harbored individuals involved in 
terrorism.12 
Presuming that the culprits of 9/11 were located in Afghanistan, the 
U.S. and allies attacked Afghanistan, captured the Bagram airfield, and 
began to detain suspected members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
combatants.13 Also, in early January 2002, Bush Administration orders 
labeled a few hundred detainees from Bagram prison in Afghanistan 
“unlawful combatants” and the U.S. military transported them to 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,14 which, for several years, was a location with 
an unresolved legal status because it is “beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of any court of the United States”15 and not part of a war zone.  
Based on urgings from the Bush Administration, Congress adopted an 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Iraq on October 10, 
2002, which required that Iraq possess chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons or programs, or be in violation of Security Council Resolutions 
for maintaining prohibited weapons or programs.16 The Bush 
Administration orated threats from Iraq for over six months17 and 
ordered an invasion of Iraq against the will of most of the international 
community and without Security Council authorization.18 There were no 
  
 12. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833, 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 13. Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A 
Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 159 (2005) (noting that after the invasion of Afghanistan, 
approximately 10,000 alleged al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters were quickly captured, but 
most were either detained in Afghanistan or released). 
 14. Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability After Visiting Camp X-Ray, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Jan. 27, 2002),  
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2348 (Rumsfeld noting 
that “Bagram and Kandahar” are locations where the military “sort[s] through these 
people” to decide whether to transfer to Guantanamo). 
 15. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (recognizing that there is no 
habeas jurisdiction when an enemy’s capture occurred “beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of any court of the United States.”). 
 16. H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) (enacted). 
 17. Bejesky, CFP, supra note 11, at 5-7; Robert Bejesky, Press Clause 
Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 348-50 (2012). See generally 
Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages and Tardy 
Corrections to Unverified Reporting, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967 (2012). 
 18. Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary 
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 295, 344-56 
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prohibited weapons or relations with al-Qaeda,19 but an eight-year 
occupation remained. 
In locale III, outside the U.S. and outside of war and occupation 
zones, the Executive assumed deeper authority and engaged in more 
controversial and abusive operations. Shortly after 9/11, Bush 
proclaimed that the CIA was authorized to kill leading terrorist 
operatives around the world because the targets were “enemy 
combatants” in a “global war.”20 The CIA also held terror suspects in 
small and secretive CIA-sponsored detention facilities in various 
countries21 and covertly transferred detainees to other states with 
Extraordinary Rendition. 
With respect to locales II and III, scholars complained that the Bush 
Administration approved interrogation methods that threatened and 
coerced detainees, imposed prolonged detention without explanation and 
proof of guilt,22 denied individual liberty and human rights protections to 
foreigners that would have been afforded to nationals, downplayed 
torture and Geneva Convention violations as unintended but necessary to 
preempt security threats,23 and exploited rhetorical discourse of fear to 
  
(2011); Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and War Powers for the 2012 
Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 2, 20-30, 41-42 (2012). 
 19. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 811-13, 875-82 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Intelligence 
Information]. 
 20. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 5127, 5133 (2010). See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War arts. 42, 111, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva I]. 
 21. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human 
Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 128 (2006); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror 
Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2005),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html. 
 22. The Comm. on Fed. Courts, The Indefinite Detention of “Enemy 
Combatants”: Balancing Due Process and National Security in the Context of the War 
on Terror, 59 THE REC. 41, 104-05 (2004). 
 23. Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The Obama Administration 
and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 33, 34, 38 (2011) (remarking that Bush’s “notorious ‘war on terror’ . . . 
undermined the absolute prohibition of torture more than any previous U.S. 
administration” and citing the “flawed ‘torture memos.’”); Katherine Gallagher, Efforts to 
Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other High-Level United States Officials Accountable for 
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consolidate an abusive system while avoiding responsibility.24 Moreover, 
the Bush Administration was cognizant25 that military personnel, 
interrogators, and private contractors committed acts amounting to 
torture or inhuman treatment on detainees for several years26 even though 
prohibitions on abusive interrogations are applicable during periods of 
armed combat and occupation27 and for law enforcement.28 
  
Torture, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1091 (2009) (stating that abuses “were the 
outgrowth, if not the direct and intended result, of US policies [for] . . . detention, 
interrogation and torture.”). 
 24. Irene Zubaida Khan, The 2007-2008 Mitchell Lecture: The Rule of Law and 
the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
 25. Sen. Patrick Leahy, There is No Justification for Torture, BOS. GLOBE, June 
28, 2004, at A11 (“U.S. officials knew the law was being violated [during interrogations] 
and for months, possibly years, [and] did virtually nothing about it.”); Khan, supra note 
24, at 5 (stating that the Bush Administration “condoned torture”). 
 26. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage 
of Justice, 32 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 103 (2014); Robert Bejesky, Pruning Non-Derogative 
Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L. REV. 821, 823-
28, 852 (2012). 
 27. Geneva I, supra note 20, art. 3 (grave breaches of the laws of war include 
“murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; . . . outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; [and] the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment.”); Jordan J. Paust, 
Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment 
and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 835 (2005) (noting 
that during an occupation, the Geneva Convention and human rights law prohibit torture, 
“‘violence,’ threat of violence, ‘cruel’ treatment, ‘physical and moral coercion . . . to 
obtain information,’ ‘physical suffering,’ ‘inhuman’ treatment, ‘degrading’ treatment, 
‘humiliating’ treatment, and ‘intimidation’ during interrogation.”). 
 28. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 
1984) (Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly prohibiting “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” for reasons of inflicting severe physical or 
mental pain or punishment, intimidating, inflicting punishment, or extracting 
information); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES217(III), art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. 
Res. 43/173, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49, princ. 6 
(Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter U.N. Body of Principles] (providing that “no person under 
any form of detention or imprisonment shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”); MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., 
 
2015] Inconsistencies in Remedial Relief for Human Rights Transgressions 301 
In summary, locale I involved heightened constitutional authority for 
the Executive due to potentially imminent national security danger, but 
the exigency is reduced for locales II and III due to distance from 
American shores.29 Operations in locale II derived from specific 
congressional authorizations to use military force, but the Commander in 
Chief executed controversial carte blanche detention and interrogation 
operations to obtain intelligence. The next part considers the legal 
controversies inherent in issuing sweeping detention and interrogation 
directives across the three venues. 
III. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
A. Locale I 
In locale I, the possibility of a terror threat is the highest, but the 
President must act reasonably within the law. The U.S. Constitution 
protects life and liberty30 for “all ‘persons’ within the United States, 
including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, 
or permanent”31 and ensures arrestees with a right to question whether 
the government’s detention complies with the law32 via a writ of habeas 
  
RL32276, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. 
IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 1 (2004), available at  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31351.pdf (noting that “torture is defined as 
an extreme form of cruel and unusual punishment committed under the color of law” and 
that the U.S. enacted statutes to enforce Article 3 of the CAT). 
 29. Bejesky, CFP, supra note 11, at 8-15 (noting that the more that individuals 
and groups are separated from 9/11, it becomes less reasonable to assume that the 
President has authority under the September 2001 AUMF). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 31. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).  
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2013) (“No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963), overruled in 
part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter “ICCPR”] 
(Human rights law treats personal liberty as a fundamental right.); Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights) art. 5(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; UDHR, supra note 28, art. 3; 
U.N. Body of Principles, supra note 28, princ. 10. 
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corpus that “shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”33 
Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft presented wide-ranging 
estimates of up to five thousand terror suspects inside the United States,34 
but of the more than one thousand individuals detained in the two months 
following the 9/11 attacks, only three non-citizens were held and charged 
with terror-related crimes, one of the three was convicted, and all the rest 
were cleared of any wrongdoing.35 The Bush Administration annually 
issued an ongoing public emergency inside the U.S. for several years,36 
and there were markedly puissant37 discussions of a need to use torturous 
  
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2013) (“Writs of 
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district 
courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.”). 
 34. ROBERT DREYFUSS, DEVIL’S GAME: HOW THE UNITED STATES HELPED 
UNLEASH FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM 13, 305 (2005). 
 35. DANIEL MOECKLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE ‘WAR ON 
TERROR’ 112 (2008). 
 36. See Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from a 
Historical Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 330-32, 340-41 (2012) [hereinafter 
“Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice”]; Robert Bejesky, A Rational Choice Reflection 
on the Balance Among Individual Rights, Collective Security, and Threat Portrayals 
Between 9/11 and the Invasion of Iraq, 18 BARRY L. REV. 31, 36-44, 51 (2012) 
[hereinafter “Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection”]; A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), 
[2005] 2 A.C. [96]-[97] (deciding that laws adopted after 9/11 to thwart threats from 
terrorism did not meet the definition of a public emergency under the ECHR because 
“[t]he real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance 
with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws 
such as these.”). 
 37. See Palash R. Ghosh, Boston Marathon Bombing: A Timeline Of Terrorist 
Attacks on US Targets Since 9/11, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.ibtimes.com/boston-marathon-bombing-timeline-terrorist-attacks-us-targets-
911-1193485?ft=k82h2 (noting that the Boston Marathon bombing was the first terrorist 
attack since 9/11); Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 36, at 38-48 
(addressing the overreaction and hyping of threats after 9/11); The Editorial Board, 
Indisputable Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/opinion/indisputable-torture-of-
prisoners.html?ref=extraordinaryrendition&_r=0 (stating that a recent “independent, 
nonpartisan panel’s examination of the interrogation and detention programs” found them 
in violation of international law and stating that there was “‘no firm or persuasive 
evidence’ that they produced valuable information that could not have been obtained by 
other means”); David Cole & Jules Lobel, Are We Safer?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 
M4 (noting that the Justice Department claimed that there were 261 “terrorism and 
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interrogation methods to thwart potential “ticking time bomb” plots on 
U.S. soil.38 The Patriot Act and other legislative enactments emphasized 
collective security and aggressive tactics that led to prolonged detention 
and distressing conditions and compromised due process protections and 
habeas corpus,39 but detention violations were not as egregious as those 
perpetrated in locales II and III. 
B. Locale II Detention 
1. General Rules 
For locale II detentions, the Hague Convention40 and Geneva 
Conventions applied by ratification or as a matter of customary 
international law.41 The Geneva Convention requires that detainees be 
promptly given notice of the reason for a detention and a right to 
challenge detentions before an administrative tribunal or court.42 
  
terrorism-related” convictions, but only two cases “actually involve[ed] attempted 
terrorist activity”).  
 38. See Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 36, at 330-32, 336. 
 39. See Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment: Special Registration and 
Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 29 VT. L. 
REV. 407, 422-25, 442-45 (2005); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and 
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the 
United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
609, 658 (2005) (stating that secrecy regularly violated the Bill of Rights and “[t]he post-
9/11 [arrest and detention] procedures violated virtually every aspect essential to 
procedural due process: notice of charges, the right to be informed of one’s rights, access 
to a fair and meaningful hearing, and a fair opportunity for review of charges and grounds 
for detention.”). 
 40. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 688-89 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 
(2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 41. Scott L. Glabe, Conflict Classification and Detainee Treatment in the War 
Against Al Qaeda, 2010-Jun. ARMY LAW. 112, 116; See, e.g., International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 172, 248-49 (1947) (holding Germans responsible for violations of customary 
international law without ratifying the 1907 Hague Convention). 
 42. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 43, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; see 
also John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in 
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other 
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However, particular rights depend on detainee status. Combatants 
captured during a military conflict can be classified as a privileged 
combatant (POWs), an unprivileged belligerent, or a civilian.43 
Combatants can be detained to prevent them from fighting again, but 
they can only be tried if they have engaged in violations of war.44 If there 
is no validated evidence of guilt to justify a security detention, such as if 
individuals pose a threat to government authorities during an 
occupation,45 individuals can be detained only as an exceptional 
measure46 and the detention must cease when reasons for detention 
cease.47 
Also, potentially applicable in locale II (but certainly applicable in 
locale III), is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),48 which requires that “[e]ach State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
  
Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 210 (2011) (noting that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention requires at least an administrative review of the justification for detention). 
 43. See Kenneth Anderson, Unprivileged Belligerents (or Illegal Combatants), 
OPINIO JURIS, (Jan. 17, 2007, 8:51 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/17/unprivileged-
belligerents-or-illegal-combatants/; but also see Benjamin Davis, Comment to 
Unprivileged Belligerents (or Illegal Combatants), OPINIO JURIS, (Jan. 17, 2007, 10:29 
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/17/unprivileged-belligerents-or-illegal-combatants/ 
(arguing that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are covered by Geneva). 
 44. See Geneva I, supra note 20, arts. 4, 118 (describing prisoner of war 
categories and stating that “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities”); ROY GUTMAN, DAVID RIEFF, ANTHONY 
GARY DWORKIN, CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 332 (2nd ed. 2007) 
(stating that “POWs are immune from prosecution for lawful acts of war”). 
 45. Geneva I, supra note 20, at art. 4. 
 46. Geneva IV, supra note 42, art. 42 (permitting deprivation of civilian liberties 
if “the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”). 
 47. E.g., Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/ 
Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 375, 382-83 (2005). 
 48. U.N. Secretary-General, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 131-32, 140, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. 1) (May 27, 2008) (noting that no one can be deprived of liberty 
irrespective of nationality, statelessness, or status); Johannes van Aggelen, The Bush 
Administration’s War on Terror: The Consequences of Unlawful Preemption and the 
Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Its Victims, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21, 56 
(2009) (noting that the ICCPR is not automatically suspended during combat). 
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Covenant.” 49 The ICCPR mandates that the legitimacy of a security 
detention or guilt for criminal offenses be determined by an impartial 
tribunal,50 which may call into question sweeping, collective detainment 
orders that do not substantiate reasons for detention and deny 
challenges.51 
2. Guilt and Detention 
Thousands of militants were detained for indefinite durations inside 
Afghanistan, with some detainees held as war prisoners, suspected 
members of al-Qaeda, and security detainees, but detentions inside war 
zones were not nearly as vexing as those at Guantánamo Bay.52 Soon 
  
 49. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 2(1). 
 50. Id. at art. 9(4) (stating that “[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court 
may decide . . . on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is 
not lawful.”); see also UDHR, supra note 28, at art. 11(1) (stating that “[e]veryone 
charged with a [criminal] offence . . . [shall have] the right to be presumed innocent until 
prove[n] guilty according to law.”). 
 51. Tyler Davidson & Kathleen Gibson, Security Detention: Experts Meeting on 
Security Detention Report, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 323, 338 (2009); Pejic, supra note 
47, at 381. 
 52. GEOFFREY S. CORN, JAMES A. SCHOETTLER, JR., DRU BRENNER-BECK, VICTOR 
M. HANSEN, DICK JACKSON, ERIC TALBOT JENSEN & MICHAEL W. LEWIS, THE WAR ON 
TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 138 (2nd ed. 2015) (noting that 
“[d]etentions of terrorist belligerent operatives under the combatant paradigm have lasted 
for years” and remarking that states have permitted detention because of “an ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan in which al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to be active”); 
Anisseh Van Engeland Nourai, Terrorism: A New Challenge for International 
Humanitarian Law?, in GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE JUDICIAL-MORAL TREATMENT OF 
THE OTHER 73 (Clark Butler, ed., 2007) (stating that the “Geneva Conventions grant 
protection to terrorists” and under “Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, a 
competent court should decide whether or not to grant the status of prisoner of war to the 
combatant seized. Until such decision is made, the detainee is considered as a prisoner of 
war and entitled to the rights secured by the Conventions”); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND 
THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES 284 n.72 (2007) 
(accentuating that the elevated controversy over Gitmo derives from the fact that 
“Guantanamo Bay is clearly outside the war zone in Afghanistan and outside the reach of 
relevant presidential war powers, especially since the offenses were not committed in 
Guantanamo.”); PANKAJ MISHRA, TEMPTATIONS OF THE WEST 280 (2006) (stating that 
“[n]o one among the thousands of Afghans detained by the thousands of Afghans 
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after prisoners began arriving at Guantánamo Bay and continuing for at 
least two years,53 top Bush administration officials called them “very 
tough, hard-core, well-trained terrorists”54 and the “‘most dangerous, 
best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth.’”55 The Bush 
Administration asserted that detainees from Afghanistan were unlawful 
enemy combatants instead of POWs,56 which was a determination 
predominantly based on detainee admissions,57 and presupposed that 
basal protection and rights were required.58 
  
detained by the U.S. military at mostly unknown locations across Afghanistan since 2001 
has been given prisoner of war status”). 
 53. US Defends Guantanamo Policy, BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2003,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3182346.stm (White House Press Secretary 
McClellan asserted that “[t]hese individuals are terrorists or supporters of terrorism.”). 
 54. Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout at NBC, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Jan. 20, 
2002, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2243. 
 55. Andy Worthington, Seven Years of Guantanamo, Seven Years of Torture and 
Lies, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2009,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-worthington/seven-years-of-
guantanamo_b_156903.html (quoting Donald Rumsfeld); Rumsfeld: Afghan Detainees at 
Gitmo Bay Will Not Be Granted POW Status, FOX NEWS, Jan. 28, 2002,  
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2002/01/28/rumsfeld-afghan-detainees-at-gitmo-bay-will-
not-be-granted-pow-status/ (stating “‘the worst of a very bad lot,’” (quoting Dick 
Cheney) and “devoted to killing millions of Americans, innocent Americans, if they 
can.”). 
 56. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 13, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 871163 (stating that the Bush Administration contended that 
“[t]he capture and detention of enemy combatants is an inherent part of waging war, and 
the President’s decision whether to detain a person as an enemy combatant is a basic 
exercise of his discretion to determine the level of force needed to prosecute the 
conflict.”). 
 57. Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Rules Detainee Tribunals Illegal, WASH. POST, Feb. 
1, 2005, at A01 (statement by Federal Judge Green). 
 58. PETER JAN HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED: THE HUMAN 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 19 (2009) (remarking that “[w]ith no official 
notification or explanation, the [Bush] administration substituted the term enemy 
combatants for unlawful combatants as a descriptor of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay” 
and by doing so put these detainees “outside the reach of the GC [Geneva Conventions],” 
which meant that “any protections the administration gave them would be largesse 
alone,” even though “[a]s unlawful combatants, the Taliban would still have recognized 
protections under the GC”). 
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Commentary to the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention 
references general justifications for detainment,59 but some Gitmo 
managers acknowledged that there was no effective screening process for 
detention, so detainee identity was not always known,60 and many 
detainees were innocent.61 In February 2006, researchers at Seton Hall 
Law School analyzed the Pentagon’s records and found that 93% of the 
prisoners brought to Camp X-Ray were not arrested by the United 
States.62 Foreigners arrested and delivered up the detainees to the U.S. 
military and U.S. taxpayers paid between $3,000 and $25,000 for 
  
 59. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (June 8, 1977), available at  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750096?OpenDocument. 
 60. Tim Golden & Don Van Natta Jr., The Reach of War; U.S. Said to Overstate 
Value of Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/21/world/the-reach-of-war-us-said-to-overstate-value-
of-guantanamo-detainees.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; 
David Rose, The Real Truth about Camp Delta, GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/03/bookextracts.usa (intelligence officials 
remarking that “‘I’m unaware of any important information in my field that’s come from 
Gitmo.’”). 
 61. Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2005); 
SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 2 
(2004) (noting that a CIA analyst interviewed dozens of Guantanamo detainees and stated 
that “‘more than half the people there didn’t belong there’” and recognized that many 
were abused); Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal & Rhuhel Ahmed, Composite Statement: 
Detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, ¶ 154 (July 26, 2004), available at  
http://ccrjustice.org/files/report_tiptonThree.pdf (released detainees explaining: “‘none of 
us were ever told why we were in Cuba other than we had been detained in Afghanistan . 
. . [as] ‘unlawful combatants.’”); Golden & Van Natta Jr., supra note 60 (General Hill 
explaining: “‘We weren’t sure in the beginning what we had; we’re not sure today what 
we have.’”). 
 62. ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 214 (2006); Mark Denbeaux et 
al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of 
Department of Defense Data at 2, 14 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at  
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.p
df (noting that 55% “are not determined to have committed any hostile acts against the 
United States or its coalition . . . [and] [o]nly 8% . . . were characterized as al Qaeda 
fighters.”); The Power of Nightmares, supra note 4 (stating that “[t]he Northern Alliance 
did produce some prisoners they claimed were Al Qaeda fighters, but there was no proof 
of this.”). 
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bounties on each captive63 in a country where the per capita income is 
several hundred dollars per year.64 
More than five hundred detainees remained at Guantanamo Bay, 
sometimes for over three years, without being granted an official legal 
process or even a hearing.65 By July 2005, an estimated 234 detainees 
had been released, with 65 transferred to other governments.66 More 
detainees were periodically released and more suspects were transported 
to Gitmo, leaving the number of detainees in November 2014 at 148.67 
By classifying detainees as “unlawful enemy combatants,” the indefinite 
detentions and characteristics of military tribunals caused controversy 
over violations of the Geneva Conventions and customary international 
law.68 
  
 63. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside Guantanamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 82 (2009); 
Denbeaux, supra note 62, at 23 (nearly $5,000 reward for individuals captured). A senior 
military official remarked that their investigators determined that Pakistanis had been 
“‘sold for bounties to U.S. forces by Afghan warlords who invented links between the 
men and al-Qaeda.’” Gregory M. Huckabee, The Politicizing of Military Law – Fruit of 
the Poisonous Tree, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 611, 670 (2010). Likewise, on September 27, 
2001, the CIA began spreading about $70 million in cash to rival tribes across the country 
to reopen the Afghan civil war. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 181 
(2004). 
 64. UN Data, Per capita GDP at current prices—US dollars, available at  
https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUSD%3Bp
cFlag%3A1 (recognizing that GDP per capita in Afghanistan in 2002 was US$193). 
 65. Mark A. Drumbl, Guantanamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 DRAKE L. 
REV. 897, 898 (2005). 
 66. John R. Crook, United States Confronts Issues Related to Detentions of 
Thousands of Terrorism Suspects, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 707, 709 (2005). 
 67. Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Fast Facts, CNN,  
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/guantanamo-bay-naval-station-fast-facts/ (last 
updated Oct. 11, 2014); see The Guantanamo Files, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/24/world/middleeast/took-up-arms-
graphic.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see also Stephen Graham, US Said to Seek 
Fewer Prisoners, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 4, 2005),  
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/01/04/us_said_to_seek_few
er_prisoners/?camp=pm (noting that the U.S. military purportedly took fewer prisoners 
than expected to avoid harsh complaints); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, 
and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 619 (2010) (reporting that there were 
250 prisoners held at Guantanamo when Bush exited office in December 2008 and 215 at 
the end of Obama’s first year). 
 68. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, The Uses and Abuses of Executive Power, 62 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 181, 1883 (2008); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 
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During the war and official occupation of Iraq, which authorized 
security detentions,69 the U.S. military detained approximately 43,000 
individuals for various durations during the first year.70 In February 
2004, U.S. military intelligence officers announced that “between 70 
percent and 90 percent of persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had 
been arrested by mistake,”71 and were held without explanation and legal 
redress.72 
  
YALE L.J. 2350, 2355 (2006) (“[T]he [Bush] Administration opposes judicial efforts to 
incorporate international and foreign law into domestic legal review so as to insulate the 
U.S. government from charges that it is violating universal human rights norms in favor 
of double standards.”). Human rights groups and European governments demanded that 
the Bush Administration either try Guantanamo detainees or release them. Tung Yin, 
Distinguishing Soldiers and Non-State Actors: Clarifying the Geneva Convention’s 
Regulation of Interrogation of Captured Combatants Through Positive Inducements, 26 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 227, 233 (2008); Warren Hoge, Investigators for U.N. Urge U.S. to Close 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2006),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/17nations.html?pagewanted=all. 
 69. Resolutions authorized the U.S. military to detain for essential security 
reasons. Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 3 (Revised), REFWORLD 
(June 27, 2004), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cd1b32.html; S.C. Res. 
1546, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (providing the authority “to take all 
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”). 
Security detention is an exceptional measure accordant with international human rights 
law. Pejic, supra note 47, at 380. 
 70. Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Scott Wilson, Mistreatment of Detainees Went 
Beyond Guards’ Abuse, WASH. POST (May 11, 2004),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15492-2004May10.html; see also 
Isabel Hilton, The 800lb Gorilla in American Foreign Policy, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 
2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/28/usa.comment (estimating that 
12,000 prisoners were then held in Iraq). 
 71. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the 
Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by 
the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (Feb. 2004), 
available at  
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/us/doc/icrc-prisoner-report-feb-2004.pdf [hereinafter 
ICRC Report]; see also George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib 
Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, FINDLAW 34-176, available at  
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2014) (estimating that between 85 to 90 percent of those detained at Abu Ghraib 
“were of no intelligence value”); MCCOY, supra note 62, at 142 (reporting that Military 
Police (MP) commander Janis Karpinski was purportedly told by her superior, Major 
General Walter Wodjakowski, “‘I don’t care if we’re holding 15,000 innocent people. 
We’re winning the war.’”); Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW 
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C. Locale II Interrogation 
1. Government Directives Issued in Violation of Laws of 
War 
The Bush administration’s espoused reason for using harsh 
interrogation was to gather information73 and thwart catastrophic terror 
threats to American citizens, but engaged in a bait-and-switch by 
extending the same notions of self-defense and necessity inside war 
zones and other countries where detainees did not pose any immediate 
hazard to Americans civilians.74 
U.S. agents interrogated detainees at Guantánamo Bay shortly after 
they arrived, but because milder interrogation techniques were not 
yielding sufficient incriminating information,75 in October 2002, Joint 
  
YORKER (May 10, 2004), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact 
(noting that women and teenagers were detained). 
 72. Asli U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of 
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 468-69 (2005); see also ICRC Report, 
supra note 71 (explaining that those interned were arrested without cause and “without 
knowing what they were accused of”); Richard Norton-Taylor, US Sweep of Arrests After 
Iraq Invasion Leads to Few Convictions, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2005), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/15/iraq.usa (noting that, from US Central 
Command numbers, from the invasion in March 2003, 35,000 Iraqis had been detained, 
1,300 had been charged with crimes, and half of those charged had been found guilty). 
 73. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 36, at 336-42. 
 74. See Fay, supra note 71 (acknowledging that “[i]nterrogating detainees was a 
massive undertaking” and accentuating that interrogation operations were intended to 
“gather initial battlefield intelligence”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law 
Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. POL’Y 343, 357 (2010) (“The Bush 
administration never developed a persuasive argument as to why the United States could 
use force on the basis of self-defense far from the location of those legally responsible for 
the 9/11 attacks.”); Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, 
WASH. POST (May 21, 2004),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43783-2004May20.html (recalling the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib and stating that interrogations were being used to obtain intelligence 
to “thwart the insurgency in Iraq” and “find Saddam Hussein or locate weapons of mass 
destruction”). 
 75. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. on 
Counter-Resistance Techniques to the Sec’y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc5.pdf; Memorandum from Jerald 
Phifer, Lieutenant Colonel, Dir. of Intelligence, U.S. Army on Request for Approval of 
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Task Force 170 imparted the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SOUTHCOM with 
three categories of progressively intensive interrogation tactics. Category 
I commissioned interrogators to impose an uncomfortable environment, 
including yelling and employing deception to inflict stressful conditions 
on detainees.76 Category II permitted interrogators to employ stress 
positions, mislead detainees with falsified documents, quarantine 
captives in solitary confinement for up to thirty days, constrict breathing, 
induce sensory deprivation, and invoke phobias.77 Category III 
authorized interrogators to threaten to kill members of a captive’s family, 
expose inmates to harshly cold temperatures and water, engage in 
daylong interrogations, and induce perceptions of drowning and 
suffocation.78 In December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved 
Category I and II, and some methods in Category III.79 Rumsfeld later 
approved other methods,80 all of which were similar to tactics contained 
in the CIA’s Kubark Interrogation Manual (1963) and were arguably 
more severe in intensity and duration than methods called cruel, 
degrading, or inhumane punishment by the European Court of Human 
  
Counter-Resistance Strategies to Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Dep’t of Def. (Oct. 
11, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf. 
 76. Phifer, supra note 75, at 1. 
 77. Id. at 1-2. 
 78. Id. at 2-3. 
 79. Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny 
Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the 
Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 541, 583, 593-94 
(2004); Paust, supra note 27, at 840. The Bush Administration approved the use of 
sensory deprivation, stress positions, intimidation using phobias and dogs, psychological 
trickery, and threat scenarios against the detainee and/or his family. See Haynes, supra 
note 75. 
 80. ALFRED W. MCCOY, Cruel Science: CIA Torture and U.S. Foreign Policy, in 
STICKS & STONES: LIVING WITH UNCERTAIN WARS 199-200 (Padraig O’Malley, Paul L. 
Atwood & Patricia Peterson, eds. 2006) (stating that in April 2003 Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld implemented methods that included “‘environmental manipulation,’ ‘reversing 
sleep cycles from night to day,’ and isolation for up to thirty days,” and further 
explaining that General Miller implemented a “‘72-point matrix for stress and duress’ 
strikingly similar to the CIA’s original torture paradigm, using ‘harsh heat or cold; 
withholding food; hooding for days at a time; naked isolation in cold, dark cells for more 
than 30 days, and . . . ‘stress positions’ designed to subject detainees to rising levels of 
pain.”). 
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Rights in 1978.81 Without these orders, the military would presumably 
have followed Field Manual 34-52 and provided an exceptionally higher 
standard of treatment for detainees.82 
As a categorical prohibition without exceptions83 and with similar 
restrictions existing in U.S. military law for 150 years,84 Article 17 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention provides:  
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give 
only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, 
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent 
information. . . .No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to 
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.85 
  
 81. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34-35 (1978), 
(holding psychological interrogation methods illegal); Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational 
Choice, supra note 36, at 383-90, 405-11. 
 82. PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 39 
(2008). The Department of Defense remarked about the Interrogation procedures: “[o]ur 
Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of 
restraint.” Haynes, supra note 75. 
 83. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush 
Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 395 (2006). 
 84. See Department OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52 INTELLIGENCE 
INTERROGATION 1-8 (1992), available at  
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf#search=%22FM%2034-
52%20Field%20Manual%22 (“Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around 
eliminating the source’s free will. . . . Torture is defined as the infliction of intense pain 
to body or mind to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure,” and “US 
policy expressly prohibits acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental 
torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to 
interrogation.”); U.S. War Dep’t, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, art. 16 (1963), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/286696dfc21d967ec12563cd00514a91?OpenDocument 
(noting that the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
(Lieber Code) stated that “[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty -- that is, the 
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions.”). 
 85. Geneva I, supra note 20, art. 17. 
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Based on Article 17, it is patently illegal to strip naked, threaten, 
constrict breathing, place in stress positions, or punish detainees in any 
way to attain information, and distinctions between “torture” and “cruel 
and inhumane punishment” are diversions because both are prohibited.86 
If occupation law applies, the occupier and the local government are both 
mandated to respect human rights law and humanitarian law for territory 
under their control.87 Also, the ICCPR88 absolutely prohibits torture, but 
could permit “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”89 
  
 86. See Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Fight it Right: Model Manual on the Law 
of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces ¶ 1405.2-.3, available at  
http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/linkedfiles/baha_mousa/baha_mousa_inquiry_evidenc
e/evidence170510/bmi08148.pdf; ICRC, The Law of Armed Conflict 14-7, June 2002, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law7_final.pdf (“[N]o coercion may be used” 
and that “[i]t is unlawful to give particularly cooperative prisoners of war more favorable 
treatment, such as better accommodation, rations or pay, since all POWs are to be treated 
alike”). Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary International Law During Armed 
Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 601, 603 (2006); Comm. on Int’l Human Rights & 
Comm. on Military Affairs and Justice, Human Rights Standards Applicable to the 
United States’ Interrogation of Detainees, 59 THE REC. 183, 220 (2005); Alan Clarke, 
Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 42-3 (2008); Paust, 
supra note 27, at 863 (noting that the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Generals, and other top 
Bush administration officials “patently violat[ed] . . . laws of war.”); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1239 
(2005) (noting that the allegation “that some individuals have no right not to be tortured 
or abused while in detention is simply wrong.”). 
 87. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 26, at 829-36; David Weissbrodt & Andrea W. 
Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of Common 
Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 381 (2008) (noting that 
using excessive abuse or torture violates customary international law, the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Common Article 3, and the ICCPR); Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive 
Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and 
Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 345, 345 (2007) (noting “that 
the tactics portrayed in photos from Abu Ghraib Prison, namely the stripping naked and 
hooding of persons for interrogation purposes and the use of dogs for interrogation and 
terroristic purposes, are patently illegal interrogation tactics,” violate “various treaty 
based and customary international legal prohibitions of cruel, inhuman, degrading, and 
humiliating treatment,” and are prohibited without exception). 
 88. Van Aggelen, supra note 48, at 56 (noting that the ICCPR is not 
automatically suspended during a period of armed combat).  
 89. Comm. on Int’l Human Rights, The Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 REC. OF THE ASS’N OF THE 
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 235, 240 (1987) (explaining that “most of the obligations 
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but only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” 
and when member states officially request exemptions.90 Moreover, the 
U.S. Senate made a reservation to the ICCPR based on prohibiting 
torture as standards equivalent to cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment 
as specified in the Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.91 Consequently, U.S. jurisprudence and law enforcement 
  
imposed by the Convention apply only to acts of torture, as defined in Article 1.”); 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 45 n.10 (Dec. 2011), 
available at  
http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2011-12-
16amr511032011enguantanamodecadeofdamage.pdf (stating that the Bush administration 
advisory “memo entirely ignored the fact that under the ICCPR, even ‘in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,’ there can be no derogation from the 
prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (articles 4 and 7).”). 
States do in fact repeatedly avoid the no derogation principle to the prohibition on “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” in the name of security threats, while the 
higher threshold crime of torture is less likely to be rationalized effectively. Richard 
Perruchoud, State Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 134 (Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud & Jillyanne 
Redpath-Cross, eds., 2012) (stating that the “national security motive is increasingly used 
as an exclusionary ground” for violating human rights protections even though the 
ICCPR prohibits “torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); 
SIMON PAYASLIAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMENIA: 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY IN A FORMER SOVIET REPUBLIC 160 (2011) (stating 
that there are nonderogation principles stated in the ICCPR that prohibit human rights 
abuses, but that the exploitation of the restrictions “for the ostensible purpose of national 
security are obvious”); Sarah Joseph, Civil and Political Rights, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 99 (Mashood A. 
Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo, eds. 2010) (opining that despite the ability to derogate on 
certain provisions of the ICCPR, states often to not file or adequately justify a derogation, 
and further writing that “many states routinely abuse so-called states of emergency to 
justify illegitimate oppressive measures”). 
 90. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 4; Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29: 
States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 21, 
2001) (“Measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an 
exceptional and temporary nature.”). 
 91. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36,192 (1990) (the U.S. is bound to prevent “‘cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ only insofar as the term . . . means the 
cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, 
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 6 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at  
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practices in the U.S. are applicable to defining torture and that “the 
Convention bans conduct that is already unconstitutional.”92 
2. Interrogations and Human Rights Abuses 
With respect to results of the Bush Administration’s directives, the 
ACLU obtained over 100,000 government documents via Freedom of 
Information Act request and noted that at the military detention centers 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and at Guantánamo Bay: 
Detainees have been beaten; forced into painful stress positions; 
threatened with death; sexually humiliated; subjected to racial and 
religious insults; stripped naked; hooded and blindfolded; exposed to 
extreme heat and cold; denied food and water; deprived of sleep; 
isolated for prolonged periods; subjected to mock executions; and 
intimidated by dogs.93 
The Bush Administration was warned of abuses at all of these 
locations. Several weeks into the invasion of Afghanistan, the United 
Nations’ Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that the Bush 
Administration should permit inspection of detention sites, provide 
details of interrogation practices, and grant a fair trial to those captured 
because prisoners were being held indefinitely, incommunicado, and 
without charge or determination of guilt or POW status, but the Bush 
  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf (stating that U.S. 
obligations “under the Torture Convention apply to the interrogation of unlawful 
combatant detainees,” but only to the extent that “cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment and punishment” was restricted under the U.S. Constitution; and Article 7 of 
the ICCPR’s “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” restriction as 
equated to cruel and unusual treatment in the Bill of Rights). 
 92. JOHN T. PARRY, EVIL, LAW AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER 
AND VIOLENCE 9 (2006). 
 93. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [ACLU], ENDURING ABUSE: TORTURE AND 
CRUEL TREATMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AT HOME AND ABROAD 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/enduring-abuse-torture-and-cruel-treatment-united-
states-home-and-abroad-executive; Fay, supra note 71, at 88 (noting that military 
intelligence employed removal of clothing as an “‘ego down’ technique” and MPs “as a 
‘control’ mechanism” and this was standard practice); ICRC, supra note 71, at 9 (stating 
that methods of ill-treatment most frequently alleged . . . included “[b]eing stripped naked 
for several days while held in solitary confinement . . . .”). 
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administration did not respond.94 Public reports of abuse followed95 and 
those carrying out the abuse affirmed that operations were “part of the 
process.”96 
The ICRC submitted a report contending that the “American military 
has intentionally used psychological and sometimes physical coercion 
‘tantamount to torture’ on prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.”97 The FBI 
complained about abuses at Guantánamo Bay and confirmed ICRC 
criticism as early as late 2002 and again in late 2003,98 but the Justice 
Department classified records of objection and misdeeds continued.99 
  
 94. Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 321 
(2004).  
 95. Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu Ghraib, 19-23, 26, 30-31 (2004), 
available at  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf (noting that detainees were 
shackled in chains, shouted at during interrogations, told their families would be harmed 
if cooperation was not forthcoming, isolated in pitch-black cells for several days at a 
time, and beaten and threatened with weapons, and that in May 2003, the ICRC reported 
over two hundred allegations of prisoner abuse to US authorities, and dozens more 
reports were issued in the following months); Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, U.S. 
Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html (stating detainees were placed in 
painful stress positions for prolonged periods, hooded, and deprived of sleep).  
 96. Human Rights Watch, supra note 95, at 31-32 (statement by military 
intelligence officer to ICRC); Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Army Tried to Limit Abu 
Ghraib Access, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1. 
 97. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2004, at A1, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html?pagewanted=all; MG George 
R. Fay, Executive Summary, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib 
Detention Facility and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 64-65, 135 (2004), 
available at  
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (U.S. officers 
used coercion to extract information in Iraq).  
 98. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detainee Interviews: Abusive Interrogation 
Issues, May 6, 2004, available at  
http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/FBI_4194.pdf (stating that “[i]n late 2002 
and continuing into mid-2003, the Behavioral Analysis Unit raised concerns over 
interrogation tactics being employed by the U.S. military,” and that the FBI objected to 
the methods approved). 
 99. ACLU, ACLU Interested Persons Memo on FBI Document Concerning 
Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay (July 12, 2005),  
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The United Nations,100 the Bush Administration, and U.S. military 
commanders acknowledged that the Geneva Conventions clearly applied 
in Iraq,101 but Iraqi detainees were subjected to the same incarceration 
and interrogation practices and many were also called “unlawful 
combatants.”102 Interrogation directives became so incorporated into the 
  
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-interested-persons-memo-fbi-documents-
concerning-detainee-abuse-guantanamo-ba. Three commandants were dismissed 
ostensibly due to disagreement in implementing the controversial detention and 
interrogation directives. Paust, supra note 87, at 348; Robert Bejesky, Closing Gitmo Due 
to the Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus During the Military Commissions Circus, 
50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 43, 61-62 (2013) [hereinafter “Bejesky, Closing Gitmo”]. 
 100. Security Council Resolution 1483 pertained to the occupation of Iraq and 
cited the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 as applicable 
during the occupation. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1483, at 2 (May 
22, 2003). 
 101. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability 
Enroute to Baghdad (May 13, 2004),  
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3010 (Rumsfeld stating 
that “from the beginning” it has been the U.S. government’s position “with respect to Iraq 
that the Geneva Conventions apply” and “anyone who is running around saying that 
Geneva Convention did not apply in Iraq is either terribly uninformed or mischievous.”); 
Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation Operations: Hearing on S. 
868 Before the Comm. on Armed Services United States Senate, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) 
(statement of Sen. Carl Levin), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108shrg96600/html/CHRG-108shrg96600.htm (Senator Levin stating that Rumsfeld 
publicly announced that the Geneva Conventions do not apply precisely to operations in 
Iraq, but “that prisoners are treated ‘consistent with, but not pursuant to….’ [the Geneva 
Conventions].”); General Ricardo Sanchez testimony before Senate Committee on Armed 
Services. Transcript: Senate Hearing on Iraq Prison Abuse, WASH. POST , May 19, 2004, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39851-2004May19.html 
(“We reviewed the recommendations with the expressed understanding, reinforced in 
conversations between General Miller and me, that they might have to be modified for 
use in Iraq where the Geneva Convention was fully applicable.”). 
 102. Transcript: Senate Hearing on Iraq Prison Abuse, supra note 101 (Colonel 
Warren stating that some detainees at Abu Ghraib were being called “unlawful 
combatants” and that interrogation procedures “are not, in and of themselves, in isolation, 
violations of the Geneva Conventions [s]pecifically” for “security internees” under the 
Fourth Convention). Senator Levin itemized interrogation methods approved by 
Rumsfeld for unlawful combatants in December 2002, and methods included “nudity, 
exploiting detainees’ fears . . . and stress positions,” additional interrogation methods 
were authorized on April 16, 2003, General Miller provided interrogation orders when 
visiting Iraq, “Policy No. 1—Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility (BIT/F) Policy” 
dated 15 July 2003 was produced for Iraq, and queried General Fay, who admitted that 
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chain of command that Rumsfeld directed Major General Geoffrey D. 
Miller, who implemented the interrogation directives at Guantánamo 
Bay, to travel to Iraq and instruct Janis Karpinski, the US Army Reserve 
officer who managed Abu Ghraib, to “Gitmoize” Abu Ghraib103 by 
extending interrogation tactics used at Guantánamo Bay104 and to involve 
and “train the MPs to work with the interrogators.”105 
The Taguba Report concluded that Miller considered it essential for 
MPs to “be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful 
exploitation of the internees” and found that MPs were required to 
“break down prisoners” before interrogation.106 In October 2003, Lt. 
Gen. Ricardo Sanchez wrote in a classified memo that interrogators at 
Abu Ghraib would work with MPs to “manipulate an internee’s emotions 
and weaknesses” and augment the effectiveness of interrogations.107 
  
these authorizations “contribute[d] to the use at Abu Ghraib of aggressive interrogation 
techniques.” Id. 
 103. See ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, Article 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH 
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 7-8, 15 (2004),  
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf; Sean D. Murphy, Executive 
Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT’L. 
820, 828-29 (2004). 
 104. See Frontline, Interview Janis Karpinski, PBS (Aug. 5, 2005),  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/karpinski.html. 
Scholars readily recognized this connection between orders to “Gitmoize” Abu Ghraib 
and wrongdoing. Nowak, Birk & Crittin, supra note 23, at 40; Joseph Pugliese, Abu 
Ghraib and its Shadow Archives, 19 L. & LITERATURE 247, 257 (2007); Leila Nadya 
Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International 
Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 312 (2006). 
 105. MCCOY, supra note 62, at 134; Ralph Wilde, Legal “Black Hole”? 
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 758-59 (2005) (noting the approach of MPs softening up 
detainees); Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1275 
(2005) (“they were responding to orders from higher-ups to ‘soften up’ the detainees for 
interrogation”). 
 106. TAGUBA, supra note 103, at 8-9, 19 (describing how interrogators 
complimented MPs for breaking down the prisoners); Fay, supra note 71, at 69 (stating 
that “MI interrogators started directing nakedness at Abu Ghraib as early as 16 
September 2003 to humiliate and break down detainees.”). 
 107. R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Gave Intelligence Bigger Role, WASH. POST, May 21, 
2004, at A17, available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43708-2004May20.html. 
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Physicians were also incorporated into the interrogations.108 In a sworn 
statement, Colonel Thomas M. Pappas explained that the MP guards 
were typically given “a copy of the interrogation plan and a written note 
as to how to execute [it,] . . . [t]he doctor and psychiatrist also look at the 
files to see what the interrogation plan recommends. . . .”109 
Human rights groups and international experts declared that 
interrogation tactics and the detentions violated international human 
rights law110 and those prohibitions apply irrespective of any ultimate 
determination of detainee wrongdoing, but interrogations were also used 
on innocent people.111 The Bush administration issued directives to 
employ abusive interrogation across all of the detention facilities,112 but 
  
 108. DEP’T OF DEF., ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION 
AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 5 (2003), available at  
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/a20.pdf (noting that Miller also 
explained to Karpinski during his early-September 2003 visit to Iraq, that “teams, 
comprised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists are essential in 
developing integrated interrogation strategies and assessing interrogation intelligence 
production.”). 
 109. Pappas Aff., at 3 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at  
http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/Pappas.pdf. 
 110. Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, 
Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C.L. REV. 1, 
10 (2002); see also Amann, supra note 94, at 319-48. 
 111. MATTHEW GUTMANAN & CATHERINE LUTZ, BREAKING RANKS: IRAQ 
VETERANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE WAR 112 (2010) (noting how veterans were 
dismayed about the infliction of interrogation procedures on people who were in the 
wrong place at the wrong time); MCCOY, supra note 62, at 133 (reporting that a former 
CIA intelligence officer objected to interrogation operations in Iraq and stated: “‘No way. 
We signed up for the core program in Afghanistan--pre-approved for operations against 
high-value terrorist targets--and now you want to use it on cabdrivers, brothers-in-law, 
and people pulled off the streets.’”). 
 112. ACLU, supra note 93; see also ACLU, ACLU Announces Publication of 
Administration of Torture, a Groundbreaking Account of Prisoner Abuse in U.S. Custody 
Abroad, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/organization-news-and-highlights/aclu-
announces-publication-iadministration-torturei-groundbreaking (“The fact that the Abu 
Ghraib photographs depicted abuse at a single prison allowed senior administration 
officials to claim, as they did repeatedly, that the abuse was confined to that facility. This 
claim is completely false. . . .”); Seymour M. Hersh, The General’s Report: How Antonio 
Taguba, Who Investigated the Abu Ghraib Scandal, Became One of its Casualities, NEW 
YORKER, June 25, 2007,  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/06/25/070625fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all 
(noting that Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt investigated abuses at Guantánamo Bay and stated: 
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it began with the assumption that captured suspected terrorists possessed 
information that could avert terror threats to Americans.113 With respect 
to the success of interrogations at Gitmo, investigators contended that the 
Bush Administration made “wildly exaggerated” claims about the value 
of interrogations114 and that detainees may have frequently complied 
with interrogators and admitted guilt to get better treatment.115 
Interrogations were applied to detainees in Iraq where the Geneva 
Convention clearly prohibited interrogation under Article 17 and where 
the regime did not have ties to al-Qaeda.116 
  
“For lack of a camera, you could have seen in Guantánamo what was seen at Abu 
Ghraib.”); Higham & Stephens, supra note 74; Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, 
Punishment and Amusement, WASH. POST, May 22, 2004, at A01, available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46523-2004May21.html. 
 113. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO 
REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 63-64 (2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (stating that 
interrogation was being used to gather intelligence for the “Global War on Terror”); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 95, at 1 (stating that “the Bush administration . . . 
required that the United States circumvent international law” and administration lawyers 
counseled that “the new war against terrorism rendered ‘obsolete’ long-standing legal 
restrictions on the treatment and interrogation of detainees.”). 
 114. See, HERSH, supra note 61, at 2 (“[T]he interrogations at Guantanamo were a 
bust. Very little useful intelligence had been gathered, while prisoners from around the 
world continued to be flow into the base and the facility constantly expanded.”); Bejesky, 
Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 36, at 342-43 (citing scholars who contend that 
torture will not provide accurate intelligence and that the Bush Administration’s 
interrogation directives were not successful); Martin Bright, Guantanamo Has ‘Failed to 
Prevent Terror Attacks’, GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2004,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/oct/03/world.guantanamo (stating Lt. Col. Anthony 
Christino accentuated that Bush and Rumsfeld “wildly exaggerated” the intelligence 
value of interrogations and remarking that interrogations “have not prevented a single 
terrorist attack”); Golden & Van Natta Jr., supra note 60 (from interviews of dozens of 
high-level American, European, and Middle Eastern intelligence, law enforcement, and 
military officials, reporting that “government and military officials have repeatedly 
exaggerated both the danger the detainees posed and the intelligence they have 
provided,” and concluding “that contrary to the repeated assertions of senior [Bush] 
administration officials, none of the detainees at . . . Guantanamo Bay ranked as leaders 
or senior operatives of Al Qaeda.”). 
 115. Rasul, Iqbal & Ahmed, supra note 61, at ¶ 156. See also Bright, supra note 
114, at 2 (conclusion drawn by Lt. Col. Anthony Christino, a twenty-year military 
intelligence officer, spent six months reviewing Guantánamo interrogation records).  
 116. See generally Bejesky, CFP, supra note 11. See Bejesky, Intelligence 
Information, supra note 19, at 858-59, 877. 
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D. Locale III 
For locale III, outside of the U.S. and outside of war and occupation 
locations, there were Executive authorizations to perpetrate 
assassinations, constitute secret CIA prisons, and engage in 
Extraordinary Rendition operations. Summary execution would 
presumably be the most severe violation of human rights law117 because 
courts have not proven guilt with respectable evidentiary standards but 
assume guilt and even positive identification based on far from infallible 
intelligence data,118 and executions, such as with Predator Drones 
strikes,119 violate due process, substantive human rights protections, and 
the sovereignty of other countries.120 
Extraordinary Renditions involve a “forced disappearance” under 
international human rights law121 and the transport of detainees to secret 
  
 117. See Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for 
your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected 
Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 889-90 (2005) (stating that assassinations violate “the 
audi alteram partem principle, preventing the target from contesting the determination 
that he or she is a terrorist, and imposing a unilateral death penalty. In this way, the very 
purpose of international human rights is defeated”). O’Connell, supra note 20, at 5133 
(emphasizing illegalities inherent in the assumption that there is a “right to kill [suspects] 
without warning and detain without trial” in a “global war”).  
 118. RICHARD L. RUSSELL, SHARPENING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 26 (2007) 
(noting that the CIA provided poor estimates throughout the Cold War). Bejesky, 
Intelligence Information, supra note 19, at 857-82 (discussing abysmally wrong 
intelligence estimates).  
 119. JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 442 (2012) 
(listing over a dozen purported al-Qaeda members who were reportedly killed by drone 
attacks). 
 120. See Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug. to Sep. 1990, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 
(1990) (restricting law enforcement officers from using firearms except in “self-defence 
or defence of others against imminent threat of death or serious injury,” or in such a way 
that is reasonable under the circumstances). Weissbrodt, & Berquist, supra note 21, at 
125, 136-37 (stating international law violations based on the assumption of a broad “war 
on terror”). 
 121. HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 505 (1999). See Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan 
Sought For Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41475-2005Jan1.html (remarking that 
the extraordinary rendition program conducted during the Bush Administration was “not 
rendering to justice, it’s kidnapping”). 
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prisons where foreign governments might utilize torture, which is 
ostensibly more violative of human rights and due process than detention 
and interrogation operations employed at Pentagon-managed facilities in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo Bay.122 Extraordinary Renditions can 
violate the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
rules, such as the right to personal security and freedom, right to have the 
lawfulness of detention and guilt determined by courts and tribunals, and 
the rights to not be arbitrarily arrested, tortured, or subjected to “inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”123 Some transferees were 
innocent people who were wrongfully arrested, detained, and abused.124 
International law provisions were also negotiated explicitly to curb 
states from using third-party countries to perpetrate wrongs against 
individuals. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture states that “[n]o 
State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
  
 122. See Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 36th Sess., ¶ 16-17, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006) (calling renditions and the use of secret prisons a per 
se violation of international law and the CAT); Catherine Powell, Essay: Scholars’ 
Statement of Principles for the New President on U.S. Detention Policy: An Agenda for 
Change, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 349 (2009) (remarking that the “Bush 
Administration’s hypocritical practice of disappearing individuals violate[d] the most 
basic legal norms in the treatment of prisoners.”). Khan, supra note 24, at 7-8 (“Suspects 
are kidnapped by or at the instigation of the CIA,” secretly detained, and delivered to 
regimes that practice torture). Sadat, supra note 104, at 313. The Comm. on Int’l Human 
Rights, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary 
Renditions”, 60 THE REC. 13, 24 (2005) (“The U.S. government is duty bound to cease 
all acts of Extraordinary Rendition, to investigate Extraordinary Renditions that have 
already taken place, and to prosecute and punish those found to have engaged in acts that 
amount[ed] to crimes in connection with Extraordinary Rendition.”). 
 123. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/148 (Mar. 4, 2008) (affirming that “prolonged incommunicado 
detention or detention in secret places can facilitate the perpetration of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and can in itself constitute a form 
of such treatment”); see also Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 21, at 136-37. 
 124. Sadat, supra note 104, at 340 (stating that at the U.S. detention facilities, 
those held “most of whom appear not to be terrorist suspects at all”); Peter A. Clark, 
Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib: The Problem of Dual Loyalty, 34 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 570, 575 (2006) (noting that the ICRC found that there were 107 
detainees under 18 across six coalition controlled prisons through June 2005). 
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would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”125 The ICCPR contains 
similar prohibitions126 and U.S. federal law was adopted to prohibit US 
officials from involuntarily extraditing individuals to third countries 
when there are “substantial grounds” for believing127 that the transfer 
would be “more likely than not” to result in torture.128 The third country 
can also violate specific human rights obligations because detainees 
could be inhumanely treated under the ICCPR or the Convention Against 
Torture, or if operations are viewed as part of a broad “war on terror,” 
the law of neutrality still mandates humane treatment for combatants 
held in neutral countries.129 
Constructive notice of torture through the rendition process should 
have been aggregated.  Former captives emerged periodically to inform 
that they had been tortured after the CIA delivered them to foreign 
  
 125. CAT, supra note 28, art. 3(1). 
 126. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment Number 31: The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (Mar. 26, 2004) (noting that the Covenant “entails an 
obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their 
territory, where there are substantial ground for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as [torture]”). See also the ICC prohibitions calling abductions a 
crime against humanity; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 7(1)(i). 
 127. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-761, 822 
(1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231) (stating that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United 
States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a 
country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically 
present in the United States.”); Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of 
International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 671 (2006) (noting that 
“substantial grounds” serves as a standard of proof that invokes obligations under Article 
3 of the CAT). 
 128. U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. 
REC. 36194 (1990), Senate Understanding II(2); Second Periodic Report of the United 
States of America to the Committee Against Torture 11, 57, May 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm. 
 129. Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
and Persons in Case of War on Land (1907), art. 12, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654. Third-
party states also have obligations under human rights law for what occurs within their 
jurisdiction. See id. 
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countries.130 The U.S. Department of State identified that countries such 
as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan were countries that 
use torture, but these countries had received up to 100 to 150 prisoners 
for interrogation,131 and many U.S. officials blatantly acknowledged the 
human rights violations.132 Commentators labeled Extraordinary 
Rendition “torture by proxy” and “the outsourcing of torture”133 to attain 
intelligence. 
  
 130. Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 
IND. L.J. 1199, 1245 (2005); CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & CANADIAN CENTRE 
FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PROSECUTION OF GEORGE 
W. BUSH PURSUANT TO THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CASE AND THE CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE 20, para. 44, available at  
http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/2011.09.29%20Bush%20Canada%20Indictment.pdf 
(reporting that “BUSH received regular intelligence and FBI briefings, including when 
Arar was in custody in New York and when he was rendered to Syria.”). 
 131. Louis Fisher, Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and 
the Press in Post-9/11 America: September 20-21, 2007: Article: Extraordinary 
Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 1405, 1406-07, 1421-22 (2008). 
Accord Powell, supra note 122, at 349; Sadat, supra note 104, at 320; Margaret L. 
Satterthwaite, Symposium on the New Face of Armed Conflict: Enemy Combatants After 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1343 (2007); The Committee on International Human 
Rights, supra note 122, at 71-74. 
 132. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 26 (2006) (noting that 
a CIA official testified before Congress about the CIA’s renditions program: “We don’t 
kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the 
[expletive] out of them.”); Katherine R. Hawkins, Note, The Promises of Torturers: 
Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition”, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 236 
(2006) (in an interview with the BBC, CIA official Michael Scheuer explaining that by 
using renditions “[i]t wouldn’t be us torturing them.”); Prof. Marjorie Cohn, A Double 
Standard on Torture: The U.S. Should Practice What We Preach, JURIST, Feb. 6, 2003 
(reporting that a U.S. diplomat remarked that a rendition “allows us to get information 
from terrorists in a way we can’t do on U.S. soil.”); Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Backstory, GUARDIAN, Aug. 31, 2011,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/extraordinary-rendition-backstory (stating 
that a former CIA agent remarked: “[i]f you want a serious interrogation, you send a 
prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you sent them to Syria. If you want 
someone to disappear – never to see them again – you send them to Egypt.”). 
 133. Satterthwaite, supra note 131, at 1335. 
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IV. REMEDIES, PUNISHMENT, AND CONVICTIONS 
A. Framework 
Within this progressively intensifying level of detainee abuse from 
locale I to III, three major consequences eventuated from detention and 
interrogation operations: —(1) a terrorist was captured and eventually 
found guilty of a crime; (2) a suspected terrorist, combatant, or innocent 
individual was captured and abused and the perpetrator of abuse was 
punished; and (3) a detainee’s human rights were violated and sought a 
remedy either while being detained or after being released. 
B. Convicting the Terrorist 
Since 9/11, dozens were convicted in federal courts and found guilty 
for an assortment of crimes that included training in terrorist facilities in 
foreign countries; making general or specific threatening statements 
involving U.S. interests or citizens; conspiring with others (including 
FBI informants and undercover agents) when making threats and taking 
steps toward a terror plot; attaining or attempting to attain weapons in 
violation of U.S. law that could be used in an act of terrorism; and 
conspiring in likely, unlikely, or remote terror plots.134 Likewise, Yaser 
Hamdi, Jose Padilla, and John Walker Lindh had a significant nexus to 
locale II because they were associated with the Taliban and had due 
process rights marginalized during detentions, but because they are 
Americans, they were ultimately tried and convicted in U.S. courts.135 
  
 134. See Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. Bucci & James Jay Carafano, 60 Terrorist 
Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (July 22, 2013),  
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since-911-continued-
lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism; See contra Robert Bejesky, Sixty Shades of Terror 
Plots: Locating the Actus Reus and the Hypothetical Line for Entrapment (submitted Oct. 
2014) (manuscript at 56-59).  
 135. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: 
Examining the Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: 
White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President 
Accountable for Nat’l Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 313-14 (2005). 
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Even though federal courts are competent to hear terrorism cases,136 if 
individuals or acts do not have a sufficient connection to the U.S., the 
Executive would be unlikely to transport foreign detainees to domestic 
soil without a clear violation of federal law because federal courts had 
previously held that it was unconstitutional to detain individuals 
indefinitely inside the U.S. based on classified evidence, which may 
involve unsubstantiated reports derived from rumor, hearsay, and biased 
sources.137 
To address the inadequate connection to the U.S. for detainees 
primarily taken from Afghanistan, a tribunal process was taken outside 
the federal court system. The novel label of unlawful enemy combatants 
imputed guilt to permit indefinite detentions under the assumption that 
there would be legitimate Gitmo tribunal processes to determine 
combatant status and guilt for criminal wrongdoing, but the tribunal 
process that was eventually instituted left much to be desired.138 The 
military commissions system finally heard cases without having 
proceedings interrupted by constitutional challenges in federal courts, but 
  
 136. Human Rights First assessed over 100 terrorism cases over the past fifteen 
years and noted that “contrary to the view of some critics, the court system is generally 
well equipped to handle most terrorism cases.” Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention and 
Preventive Warfare: U.S. National Security Policies Obama Should Abandon, 3 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 341, 354 (2009) (quoting Richard B. Zahel & James J. Benjamin, 
Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST (May 2008)).  
 137. Akram & Karmeley, supra note 39, at 618-19; see Susan M. Akram & Kevin 
R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After Sept. 11, 2001: The Targeting 
of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 322 (2002) (reporting that 
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, two dozen Arabs were 
incarcerated for two to four years). 
 138. The Bush Administration’s tribunal process did not afford exceptional 
individual right protections. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771 (noting that the rules departed 
from the courts-martial proceedings without adequate reason). Military tribunals 
generally do not always provide excellent right protections. See General William C. 
Westmoreland & Major General George S. Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized 
Uniform Code of Military Justice in Combat, 3 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 61-66 
(1980); See also Lobel, supra note 136; See generally Bejesky, Closing Gitmo, supra 
note 99. 
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only six Guantánamo detainees were convicted through February 
2013.139 
C. Convicting the Abuser 
The fact that the Bush Administration approved interrogation methods 
and directed interrogations to remain within U.S. law cannot explain how 
as many as two hundred detainees died, with at least 34 confirmed 
homicides, while in U.S. custody through the first five years of 
detentions, or how countless others emerged with indications that they 
were physically beaten and emotionally abused.140 Human Rights Watch 
highlighted that offenses, including death, trauma, and various other 
human rights violations, routinely occurred at Abu Ghraib and dozens of 
other U.S. detention facilities worldwide, but the “only wrongdoers being 
brought to justice [were] those at the bottom of the chain of 
command.”141 Interrogators were generally not prosecuted142 and this was 
likely due to the presumption that interrogation directives were legal, 
which effectively meant that only those ostensibly acting ultra vires to 
high-level detention and interrogation directives were subject to criminal 
punishment. 
For example, a CIA contract employee and a former Special Forces 
interrogator, David A. Passaro, beat Abdul Wali to death in Afghanistan 
in June 2003, and he became the first U.S. civilian to be indicted in U.S. 
federal court for abusing a detainee.143 In Iraq, the abuse scandal at Abu 
  
 139. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and 
Trials in Federal Criminal Court, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 7-5700, 10 (2013), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf. 
 140. HINA SHAMSI, COMMAND’S RESPONSIBILITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S. 
CUSTODY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 1 (Deborah Pearlstein ed., 2006), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf; 
Bassiouni, supra note 83, at 389-90, 398-99, 402-03, 406 (placing detainee death toll at 
two hundred through 2006 and noting that military doctors signed many death certificates 
with torture as the cause). 
 141. PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE 
TURN EVIL 403-04 (2007). 
 142. Khan, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that despite evidence of deaths occurring 
during interrogation, “not one single CIA personnel has been prosecuted.”). 
 143. MCCOY, supra note 62, at 147; Farah Stockman, CIA Contractor is Charged 
in Beating of Afghan Detainee, BOSTON.COM NEWS, June 18, 2004,  
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Ghraib prison captured attention, and twenty-seven military and 
intelligence officials were implicated in the abuse,144 but significant 
penalties were only imposed on a dozen low-level soldiers.145 Stanford 
Professor Philip Zimbardo underscored that the Bush Administration 
commanded the interrogation system, ordered the policies down the 
chain of command, and “isolate[d] the problem in order to deflect 
attention and blame away from those at the top.”146   
With respect to locale III, there were approximately 150 
Extraordinary Renditions to various countries, and foreign countries 
conducted the investigations.147 On at least three occasions, German 
prosecutors initiated investigations against U.S. agents, including 
Americans operating renditions in Germany, the U.S. policymakers who 
were architects of the interrogation programs in Washington D.C., and 
the agents committing abuses at Abu Ghraib, but cases were dismissed 
because the defendants were not present in Germany and the U.S. 




 144. JONES & FAY, supra note 97, at 4; see TAGUBA, supra note 103, at 16 
(documenting “systemic,” “intentionally perpetrated,” “sadistic, blatant, and wanton 
criminal abuses”). 
 145. Simon Chesterman, Intelligence Services, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC 
ORDER: THE OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS 192 (Simon Chesterman 
& Angelina Fisher, eds. 2009) (remarking that “[t]welve uniformed personnel were 
convicted of various charges; most were given minor sentences but a handful of soldiers 
received multiple-year prison terms” and stating that “[o]nly one person above the rank 
of staff sergeant faced a court-martial and was cleared of any wrongdoing . . .”). 
 146. ZIMBARDO, supra note 141, at 10; Tim Berard, Collective Action, Collective 
Reaction: Inspecting Bad Apples in Accounts for Organizational Deviance and 
Discrimination, in INTERACTION AND EVERYDAY LIFE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND 
ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE PSATHAS 266 (Hisashi Nasu & 
Frances Chaput Waksler, eds., 2012) (accentuating the blame being placed on low level 
troops and stating that “the bad apples argument” has been interpreted as means “to 
reduce or deny responsibility of the U.S. military or the Bush administration in the Abu 
Ghraib scandal.”). 
 147. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 101 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 490, 490 (2007). 
 148. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW 
AND PRACTICE 9 (6th ed. 2014) (further noting that “in 2010, the German Administrative 
Court of Cologne dismissed an action by which Khaled El-Masri, plaintiff, sought to 
compel the German government to seek the extradition of thirteen CIA agents from the 
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criminal trial in absentia and three years of appellate processes, in 
September 2012, Italy’s highest criminal court upheld the convictions of 
23 CIA agents who were involved in Extraordinary Rendition operations 
for kidnapping Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr,149 a reported radical 
Egyptian cleric, off the streets of Milan and taking him to Cairo, where 
he was imprisoned, tortured, and beaten for fourteen months.150 In 
December 2012, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held that 
Macedonia violated its obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights for hosting a covert U.S. interrogation facility and for 
serving as a transfer point for renditions, and in July 2014, the ECHR 
held that Poland was responsible for “torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment” when transferring two terror suspects to “black sites” in 
northern Poland.151 The importance of inquiries and foreign court 
processes were ostensibly elevated by the severity of abuse and the fact 
that U.S. operations transgressed international law and were executed 
inside foreign states. Critics contended that top Bush Administration 
  
United States for allegedly kidnapping and transporting him to Macedonia for torture and 
interrogation.”); LISA HAJJAR, TORTURE: A SOCIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
48 (2013) (providing the example of a criminal case in 2004 being brought in Germany 
against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and a dozen military and civilian agents for torture 
at Abu Ghraib and the case being dismissed because of pressure from the U.S. 
government, and also referring to a case brought by Germany against Rumsfeld and other 
policymakers in the Bush Administration who were architects of the interrogation 
program and prosecutors dismissing the case because the defendants were not present in 
Germany).  
 149. Andrea Vogt, Italy Upholds Rendition Convictions for 23 Americans, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2012,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/20/italy-rendition-convictions-americans. 
 150. Craig Whitlock, In Letter, Radical Cleric Details CIA Abduction, Egyptian 
Torture, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/09/AR2006110901686.html. 
 151. Rick Lyman, Poland Appeals European Court of Human Rights Ruling on 
C.I.A. ‘Black Site’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2014,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/europe/extraordinary-rendition-ruling-
appealed-by-poland.html?_r=0; European Court of Human Rights, Press Release, 
Macedonian Government Responsible for Torture, Ill-Treatment and Secret Rendition of 
a Man Suspected of Terrorist Ties, Dec. 13, 2012,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/703_echrjudgme
nt_/703_echrjudgment_en.pdf. 
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officials who approved Extraordinary Rendition should have been 
brought to justice.152 
D. Remedying Human Rights Violations  
1. Challenging Detention with Habeas Corpus 
Two foremost issues regarding remedying detention and abuse were 
whether habeas corpus petitions could challenge detention and whether 
victims alleging human rights violations in locales II and III could attain 
a civil remedy. International law requires a competent and equitable 
tribunal, fair procedures to protect innocence, and appeal processes to 
justly assess guilt for a detention.153 Detentions inside the U.S. could be 
challenged in federal court, but habeas challenges were inconceivable in 
locale III because the abduction, incarceration, and Extraordinary 
Renditions were conducted secretly and occurred in foreign 
jurisdictions.154 Detentions in war or occupation zones were also not 
challengeable within the U.S. court system because operations occurred 
  
 152. See JOHN CONYERS JR., REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 271-72 (Jan. 13, 
2009), available at  
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/IPres090113.pdf; see also US/Italy: 
Italian Court Challenges CIA Rendition Program, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 16, 2008),  
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/15/usitaly-italian-court-challenges-cia-rendition-
program; see also Evan Wilson et. al., International Legal Updates, 17(2) HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 40, 47 (2010) (reporting that Sabrina De Sousa, one of the convicted CIA agents, 
stated: “Clearly, we broke a law, and we’re paying for the mistakes right now of whoever 
authorized and approved this.”). 
 153. The U.S. is a party to the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 32; see also United 
States: Guantanamo Two Years On, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 9, 2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm. 
 154. Secrecy can pose enormous challenges for oversight in democracy. See 
generally David Cole, Federico Fabbrini & Arianna Vedaschi, Introduction, in SECRECY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (David Cole, 
Federico Fabbrini & Arianna Vedaschi, eds., 2013) (remarking that “[n]o issue more 
profoundly challenges the commitments of constitutional democracy than secrecy in 
government”); LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006) (noting that the state secrets 
doctrine can be employed illegitimately); see Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege 
and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1959 (2007) (stating that the state 
secret doctrine diminishes congressional and judicial oversight of the Executive). 
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in foreign countries and more clearly fell within the prerogative of the 
Commander in Chief155 (or the foreign court system under a continuing 
occupation). However, U.S. military detentions at Guantánamo Bay did 
not embody these characteristics. 
Congress has the constitutional authority to establish judicial organs, 
institute right protections, and enact court procedures, and the American 
judiciary has dominion as the guarantor of rights and adjudicator of 
guilt,156 but detainees at Guantánamo Bay were held for several years 
based on President Bush issuing himself and Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld with judicial and legislative powers157 and with the authority to 
decide which defendants would be tried by a military commission.158 The 
Tribunal also operated outside of evidentiary rules established in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice159 and incorporated secret trial 
procedures and denied the right to an attorney and to an adequate 
defense, which are violations of human rights law.160 In a succession of 
  
 155. Irota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam) (denying habeas 
relief under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to Japanese officials who were 
convicted by the U.S. military tribunal in Japan, despite that the U.S. occupied and 
effectively controlled Japan); see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66, 778 (holding that 
nineteen alien petitioners, convicted by a U.S. military commission for taking hostile 
actions against the U.S. in China and were currently being held in a German prison, were 
not protected under the U.S. Constitution). 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8 (specifying Congress’s right “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”); Id. art. III sec. 2 (detailing that “[t]he judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States . . .” and that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury”). 
 157. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), 
at. 6(H)(2)(4); van Aggelen, supra note 48, at 37-38; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
153 (stating that “[u]nder the rules, the president, through his designees, serves as 
prosecutor, judge, jury, and potentially, executioner . . . .”). 
 158. van Aggelen, supra note 48, at 46-47 (noting that Judge Stephen Henley 
befittingly indicated that “[t]he government has not cited any persuasive authority for the 
proposition that acting as an unlawful enemy combatant, by itself, is a violation of the 
laws of war . . . [The] case must be based on the nature of the act, not simply on the status 
of the accused.”); Detention, Treatment, and Trial, supra note 12; Amann, supra note 94, 
at 269-70 (noting that Rumsfeld was assigned to appoint panels, establish rules and 
procedures, and determine the level of proof needed to convict a defendant). 
 159. Detention, Treatment and Trial, supra note 12, at 1(e) (affirming that the 
system changed the normal rules of “law and rules of evidence.”); MCCOY, supra note 
62, at 214. 
 160. The Secretary-General, supra note 48, at 136; U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 
Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 
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cases that became progressively more critical, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that detainees were entitled to judicial review,161 the Bush 
Administration did not have authority to constitute the tribunals,162 and 
that habeas corpus rights under the U.S. Constitution did apply because 
the U.S. exercised “complete jurisdiction and control” over the 
Guantanamo Bay facility.163 
2. Civil Remedies for Torture and Other Abuses During 
Interrogation  
With respect to civil remedies, it is not clear that severe abuses 
regularly occurred in locale I,164 but in locale II, the Pentagon did have 
authority to provide damage remedies because it administratively 
allocated $26 million for 21,450 claims arising from actions occurring 
inside Afghanistan and Iraq through 2007.165 A few of these awardees 
  
at 6, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (affirming that incarcerating detainees 
indefinitely “at Guantanamo, without sufficient legal safeguards and without judicial 
assessment of the justification for their detention” violates the Convention Against 
Torture and stated that detainees should be released or granted judicial process and 
further appalled that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 sought to withdraw habeas 
corpus petitions); PETER JAN HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED: THE HUMAN 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR 114 (2009) (remarking that when the CSRT 
hearings did commence, the procedures “allowed unreliable and hearsay evidence, as 
well as secret or classified information, often from anonymous sources,” and 
“[i]nformation obtained by torture,” and defendants could not access classified evidence). 
 161. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004) 
 162. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793 (2006). 
 163. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2252-53 (2008). 
 164. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FIGHTING TERRORISM FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY 6 
(2008) (remarking that “[s]ome have suggested that it would be difficult to prosecute 
terrorism suspects in US federal courts because much of the evidence against them is 
tainted by coercion, abuse, or torture, and would not be admissible in court”). 
Consequently, if human rights abuses had been common in the U.S., cases would not 
have been brought in federal courts. In one compilation of cases involving acts inside the 
U.S., there are no substantial indications of human rights abuses. Zuckerman, Bucci & 
Carafano, supra note 134; See also Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 98 
(disagreeing with abuse at Gitmo, which is the perspective of the FBI, the agency with 
federal law enforcement authority inside the U.S.). 
 165. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN 50-51 (2007), available at  
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07699.pdf. 
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were abused prisoners and some violations were worse than others, but 
an average payout of $1,212 may not be significant compensation. 
Iraqis were restricted from attaining compensation in their own courts. 
The U.S.-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) enacted 
Order 17 to strip Iraqi courts from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. 
military personnel and military contractors,166 conferring them with 
consummate immunity for any criminal or civil violation under Iraqi 
law.167 Iraqis filed civil suits in U.S. federal courts for abuse occurring in 
detention facilities in Iraq, but because of the sovereign immunity 
defense, plaintiffs generally could not name the U.S., U.S. military, or 
government officials in their official capacity (who could substitute the 
state) as the defendant.168 When foreign plaintiff-detainees sued U.S. top 
officials in their personal capacity, federal courts dismissed the cases on 
several grounds.169  
  
 166. See War Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 54-55 (2007) (statement of Scott Horton, Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law). 
 167. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Status of US Forces in Iraq from 2003-2008, 11 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2010); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 at 1 (June 27, 
2004) (stating that “under international law occupying powers, including their forces, 
personnel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not subject to the laws or 
jurisdiction of the occupied territory”), available at  
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_regulations/sofas/us_iraq_cpa_order_17.pdf. 
 168. John F. O’Connor, Contractor Tort Immunity Under the Law of Military 
Occupation, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 367, 369-70 (2009). 
 169. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (barring the claims 
because the Federal Tort Claims Act required plaintiffs to pursue administrative remedies 
first); In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 87-91, 101 
(D.D.C. 2007) (alleging that they were hung from the ceiling by chains, hit until 
unconscious, deprived of food and sleep, tormented with dogs, forced to remain in stress 
positions, stripped naked and photographed, subjected to mock executions, and beaten, 
burned, and stabbed, the plaintiffs sued Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Colonel 
Janet Karpinski, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, and Army Colonel Thomas 
Pappas; the court dismissed the personal capacity complaint because foreign citizens 
“without property or presence in the United States” have no constitutional rights under 
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments); Lee Ross, Supreme Court Rejects Appeal of Abu 
Ghraib Inmates Claiming War Crimes Violations, FOX NEWS, (June 27, 2011),  
http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20130109/NEWS/301090313/Iraqis-held-at-Abu-
Ghraib-other-sites-get-5M (claiming war crimes violations). 
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Former detainees sued private contractors in U.S. federal court for 
abuse in detention facilities in Iraq and after several years of litigation, in 
January 2013, L-3 Services settled by paying $5.28 million to the 
plaintiffs, but this was the first federal court litigation to result in 
remedial relief for any plaintiff-detainees against the U.S. government or 
private contractors.170 The settlement made the lawsuit terminate without 
a court deciding to impose liability under the law, setting precedent, or 
implicating the top of the chain of command for issuing interrogation 
orders, leaving immunities for the U.S. government intact.171 
For remedies involving detainee abuse in locale III, there was a 
similar protective defense. Consider the case of German Khaled El-
Masri, which European Union investigators called indisputably true.172 
The Council of Europe described that El-Masri was taken by the CIA in 
Macedonia and transported through a “rendition circuit” from 
Macedonia, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he 
was held without criminal charges in a “small, filthy, concrete cell” for 
four months and in solitary confinement for several more weeks.173 The 
ECHR found that El-Masri was “severely beaten, sodomized, shackled 
and hooded, and subjected to total sensory deprivation” by his CIA 
captors.174 El-Masri’s case was one of mistaken identity.175 
After his release, El-Masri sued the U.S. government via Bivens 
challenge, but his case was dismissed because his claim was 
  
 170. Yost, supra note 2. 
 171. Kissinger v. Schneider, 412 F.3d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Kissinger v. 
Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253-59 (D.D.C. 2004); Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. 
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 173. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CIA ABOVE THE LAW? SECRET DETENTIONS AND 
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Torture, REUTERS, Dec. 14, 2012, http://rt.com/news/cia-torture-eu-citizen-048/. 
 175. Fisher, supra note 131, at 1443. 
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subordinated to national security and the state secret privilege prevented 
El-Masri from accessing the documents needed to determine why he was 
detained.176 The result in U.S. federal courts is all the more controversial 
when the ECHR ordered Macedonia to pay El-Masri €60,000 for 
permitting the CIA’s abuse inside its sovereign jurisdiction.177 
Nonetheless, with respect to the American precedent, El-Masri 
ostensibly affirms that non-citizens may have no remedial recourse in 
U.S. federal court when abducted by American agents in a foreign 
country and transported to another territory pursuant to operations 
conducted in the name of national security, irrespective of the level of 
abuse or the credibility of the information underlying the arrest and 
detention.178 A similar federal court reasoning and dismissal followed for 
Maher Arar, who was rendered to and abused in Syria,179 and while the 
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U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear Arar’s appeal in 2010, the U.S. 
government provided an apology and $10.5 million in compensation.180 
Similar to the L-3 Services settlement, compensation was granted 
without admitting illegalities and losing the case on the merits under 
binding law.181 
Implicating private-sector civil defendants in Extraordinary 
Rendition, three plaintiffs sued Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Boeing, in U.S. District Court for allegedly playing an 
“integral role” with the CIA in a “willful, intentional, wanton, malicious 
and oppressive” manner to facilitate Extraordinary Rendition,182 but CIA 
Director Michael Hayden intervened in the complaint and submitted state 
secret declarations.183 In February 2008 the federal district court 
dismissed the complaint against Jeppesen on the state secrets privilege184 
and after two years of appeals, the dismissal was affirmed.185 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The phrase “global war on terror” served as a heuristic device to 
instill the perception of broad and unrestricted Executive war powers 
over military and law enforcement operations occurring in three general 
locales with three sets of applicable laws. Inside the U.S. (locale I), the 
inherent Executive law enforcement power is broad but is limited by the 
Constitution, federal law, and a reasonable factual interpretation of 
threats. Excessively abusive detentions and interrogations generally did 
not occur inside the U.S. Had interrogation operations, such as those that 
the Bush Administration approved for locales II and III, been employed 
inside the U.S., the American criminal justice system would have 
confronted insurmountable stress, many federal court criminal 
convictions might have been suspect, and numerous civil cases for 
remedial relief would likely have arisen. Relative to domestic arrestees, 
imminent danger from terrorism is not as elevated with detainees held in 
foreign countries, but the Bush Administration issued interrogation 
operations for war and occupation zones (locale II) and for other foreign 
jurisdictions (locale III). 
The interrogation directives likely violated explicit prohibitions in the 
Geneva Conventions and human rights law, but the primary remedy for 
abused detainees was the far from generous administrative remedy. 
Significant civil compensation was paid to some plaintiffs following 
federal court litigation, including the L-3 Services settlement for $5.28 
million to Iraqi plaintiffs for locale II operations and the federal 
government payment of $10.5 million to Maher Arar for abuse during 
Extraordinary Rendition, but federal courts did not issue any decision 
that enforced civil liability for abuses during detention or interrogation 
under substantive international or federal law.  
The result is confounding when low-level individuals were criminally 
convicted for executing acts that might not have even been ultra vires to 
Executive directives;186 many Executive directives could be viewed as 
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unconstitutional and in violation of the laws of war, human rights law, 
and federal law, and federal courts have imposed civil remedies on 
foreign government officials for international law violations in Alien 
Tort Statute cases.187 Consequently, foreign plaintiffs can successfully 
sue foreign defendants, including foreign government officials in U.S. 
federal courts for acts infringing international law occurring outside the 
U.S., but foreign plaintiffs are unlikely to be successful against American 
government officials as defendants for acts occurring outside the U.S. 
that infringe international and (perhaps even) federal law due to the 
political question doctrine,188 deference to Executive secrecy 
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official immunities,190 and (particularly during the Bush Administration) 
the questionable advice of appointed legal counsel who opined that 
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